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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950431-CA
Priority No. 2

KIP LANE MASSEY,
Defendant/Appellant,

This case arises from a jury conviction for (1) theft by
receiving stolen property, a 2nd degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and (2) sale of a firearm to a
juvenile, a 3rd degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-509.9 (1995).

Prior to the jury trial in this matter,

counsel for Appellant Kip Lane Massey ("Massey") requested the
entry of an order continuing the trial, scheduled for April 13,
1995, in order that co-defendant Casey Sanslow ("Sanslow") would
be able to testify in Massey's defense.

Sanslow was scheduled to

enter a guilty plea to the same charges in a separate matter on
April 17, 1995. Upon the advice of counsel, Sanslow invoked his
fifth amendment right against self incrimination until such time
as the guilty plea in his case was entered. Thus, Sanslow was
legally unavailable to testify in Massey's trial at the scheduled
time.
The trial court denied Massey's motion to continue the April
13th trial. Consequently, since Sanslow was legally unavailable
to testify at trial, counsel for Massey requested that the trial
court admit into evidence a two-sentence written statement from
Sanslow exonerating Massey.

The trial court granted the request.
1

Massey's jury trial concluded on April 14, 1995.

On April

17, 1995, Sanslow entered his guilty plea in the separate matter.
Since he no longer was invoking his fifth amendment right,
Sanslow made available to Massey for the first time in June 1995
a more detailed outline concerning his involvement in the crimes.
The affidavit testimony lends unyielding credibility to the twosentence written statement. Massey filed the sworn statement
together with a motion for a new trial on the basis that Sanslow
would be able now to provide critically important testimony.

The

trial court denied the motion and Massey has appealed from that
order on the grounds that the trial court erred in its ruling
where Massey has satisfied the three elements for a new trial set
forth in State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991).
The state's response to the issue raised on appeal is two
fold.

First, the state asserts the issue was not properly

preserved for appeal purposes.

Second, the state argues that

Massey has failed to satisfy two of the three elements set forth
in James, 819 P.2d at 793, and necessary to a reversal of the
trial court's order.

The state's responses are addressed below.

POINT I. MASSEY PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUES FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW,
In response to the issue raised in Massey's opening brief,
the state claims Massey "waived his appellate claim." (Brief of
Appellee ("S.B.") at 8-9.) According to the state, the issue was
not preserved where Massey sought the following:
(1) The entry of an order continuing the trial (Record on
Appeal ("R.") at 99).
When the trial court indicated that request would be denied,
2

Massey requested in the alternative,
(2) the entry of an order admitting into evidence Sanslow's
two-sentence, written confession since Sanslow was legally
unavailable to testify (R. at 100 ("we are aware of the
problem the co-defendant [Sanslow] has [in invoking the
fifth amendment until such time as his plea is entered],
however I have no control over when he enters his plea or
not. If [the court is inclined to go forward with the trial
on April 13] , we'd be making a motion that [Sanslow] be at
least declared unavailable so we can use his statement").
Once Sanslow was available after trial to provide details about
the transaction with the Kirbys, Massey requested,
(3) the entry of an order for a new trial on the grounds
that previously unavailable and undiscoverable evidence was
now discoverable and available (R. 84-85; 103-03).
The state's waiver argument suggests that although Massey
made a request to admit the written statement into evidence as a
fall-back position after the trial court indicated it would deny
the motion to continue the trial, Massey was estopped from
seeking a new trial when Sanslow was able to make more detailed
information available concerning his involvement in the crimes.
See State v. Anderson, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37 (Utah 1996)
(party cannot take advantage of error committed at trial when
party led trial court into committing error).

The state's

argument also suggests Massey made the motion for a new trial
simply because he was displeased with the verdict.

The state's

waiver argument lacks merit.
Massey did not lead the trial court into committing error,
then seek to "take advantage of the error" by appealing the case.
See Id.

He requested use of the written statement after the

court denied the motion to continue and because it was the only
statement available.

At the time of trial, Massey could not and

3

had no way to guarantee that at some later date Sanslow would be
available to provide a more detailed statement. Thus, Massey
sought entry of the written statement.

He had no other way to

get Sanslow's admission into evidence since the trial court had
already indicated it would deny his motion to continue the trial.
Once Sanslow made a more detailed statement available,
Massey had an independent, legally justifiable basis for
requesting a new trial: Sanslow's ability to provide for the
first time details concerning the transaction with the Kirbys.
The state cites to State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023
(Utah 1987), in support of its waiver argument. (S.B. at 9.)
That case is distinguishable. In Medina, defendant was charged
with second-degree murder.

Id. at 1022.

At the close of the

evidence, the jury commenced a lengthy deliberation, then sent a
question to the judge.

The judge called the jury to the

courtroom to provide a modified instruction, which counsel for
both parties reviewed.

The judge asked each side if there were

any objections to the instruction.

Defense counsel stated: "I

have no objection. I have read it," referring to the instruction.
Id. The judge provided the jury with the new instruction and the
jury returned with a guilty verdict.

Id. Defendant appealed the

judgment and asked the court to consider whether the modified
instruction was acceptable.

Id. at 1022-23.

Later in Anderson, 3 05 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged "the [Medina] instruction seemed illadvised." However, the Medina court declined to reach the issue
on appeal since "defense counsel not only failed to object to the
4

proposed instruction, but she affirmatively stated that after
reading it, she had 'no objection.7" Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023.
In this matter, defense counsel could not have reviewed or
discovered the details of Sanslow's testimony until after the
trial. Once defense counsel was apprised of Sanslow's more detailed testimony, counsel moved for a new trial in order that it
could be presented to the trier of fact for consideration. This
case would be similar to Medina if counsel had known the content
of Sanslow's more detailed testimony prior to trial and he had
been available to testify, yet counsel sought admission only of
the written statement. Since it was impossible prior to trial for
counsel to discover Sanslow's complete testimony, this case compels a result different from Medina. By seeking admission of the
written statement after the court denied the motion to continue,
Massey did not concede it was a sufficient replacement for
detailed testimony that would be discovered later, after trial.
Furthermore, the trial court considered Massey's motion for
a new trial on the merits, thereby preserving the issue for
appeal. (R. 461-68.)

See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161

(Utah 1991) (when trial court addresses merits of issue raised
for first time in new trial motion, any prior waiver is excused);
State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S.
865 (1993) . The matter must now be resolved on appeal.
POINT II. ACCORDING TO THE STATE, MASSEY HAS SATISFIED
REQUIREMENTS FOR A NEW TRIAL SET FORTH IN JAMES.
In response to Massey's argument on the merits, the state
does not dispute that Massey has satisfied the first prong set

5

forth in State v. James 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991), compelling
a reversal of the trial court's ruling.

(See S.B. at 9-16.)

According to the court in James, a trial court's failure to grant
a motion for a new trial is an abuse of discretion where "there
is a grave suspicion that justice may have miscarried because of
the lack of enlightenment on a vital point which new evidence
will apparently supply, and the other elements attendant on
obtaining a new trial . . . are present." James, 819 P.2d at 794
n.41.

The "other elements" have been set forth as follows: "(1)

[the evidence] must be such as could not with reasonable
diligence have been discoverable and produced at the trial; (2)
it must not be merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to
render a different result probable on the retrial of the case."
Id.
The state acknowledges by its silence that the first element
in James has been satisfied; the evidence at issue could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered or produced at the
trial. The state contends only that the second and third elements
have not been satisfied.

(See S.B. in general.)

A. THE STATE'S ADMISSIONS BELIE ITS ASSERTION THAT
SANSLOWS AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY WAS "MERELY CUMULATIVE."
The state claims Sanslow's affidavit testimony was "merely
cumulative to the [two-sentence written] confession." (S.B. at 912.)

Yet in support of that conclusion, the state admits Sanslow

would have provided additional, detailed information if he had
testified as set forth in the affidavit. The state acknowledges
Sanslow would have provided "extra detail [into] peripheral

6

matters, like corroborating that defendant had never seen the
Derringer, specifically identifying Travis Kirby as the buyer,
and specifically identifying the .22 pistol as a Derringer."
(S.B. at 11.)

In fact, Sanslow was the only person for Massey's

defense who could have described in detail the transaction, the
gun, and the Kirby brother involved in the transaction.

The

affidavit outlines how and when Sanslow came to be in possession
of the Derringer pistol (R. 103, HU 3 and 4 ) ; why he wanted to
get rid of it (R. 104, *f 5 ) ; his conversation with the Kirby
brother who purchased the pistol (R. 104, H 6 ) ; information going
to the fact that Massey was not present or at home during the
transaction (R. 104, % 7 and 8 ) ; and the aftermath of the
incident, including Sanslow's entry of the guilty plea (R. 104,
Kit 9-11) . With the additional information, the affidavit is
anything but "merely cumulative."

|

The state's admissions concerning the "extra detail" belie
its conclusion that the affidavit was "merely cumulative."

The

extra detail goes to the heart of the distinction the state
attempts to draw between this matter and the facts in James,
(S.B. 11-12.)
In James, witness Peterson claimed that James confessed in
jail to killing his son.
confession.

James denied that he made the

The defense discovered after trial a new witness

that would corroborate James' testimony disavowing the
confession.

The trial court found the new witness's testimony to

be cumulative.

On appeal, "[t]he supreme court reversed, holding

that the evidence was not cumulative, but was 'independent
7

evidence which corroborated defendant's statements.'" (S.B. at
11-12 (quoting James, 819 P.2d at 795).)
According to the state, the James jury "heard no testimony,
live or otherwise, corroborating James' testimony.

[Yet in] this

case, the jury heard hearsay testimony corroborating defendant's
testimony."

(S.B. at 12.)

of the ruling in James.

The state has misconstrued the nature

There the court considered the

independent aspects of the newly discovered evidence.

The new

witness offered evidence separate from that which was presented
to the jury at trial.

The independent evidence corroborated

James' testimony that he did not make the confession.
Likewise, Sanslow's testimony is independent in nature from
Massey's testimony and the two-sentence statement as set forth
above.

As acknowledged by the prosecutor in this matter, the

two-sentence written statement failed to specifically identify
the handgun that was sold to the Kirbys.
"Notice how [Sanslow] identifies the gun.
calls it is a little .22 handgun.
Casey Sanslow.

(R. 4 08-09 (Prosecutor:
The only thing he

This is the statement from

Doesn't even refer to it as a Derringer").)

In

addition, the prosecutor attacked the credibility of Sanslow's
written statement because it lacked detail and the parties were
not able to question Sanslow to clarify facts. (R. 408-09.)

The

prosecutor stated:
Notice how [Sanslow] identifies the gun. The only thing he
calls it is a little .22 handgun. This is the statement
from Casey Sanslow. Doesn't even refer to it as a
Derringer. You got to wonder whether he's even talking
about the same gun. I mean maybe they sold so many guns,
they're starting to get confused over how many guns they
sold and on which days.
8

All he says is, "I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession
on June 21st a little .22 handgun, which I sold to the Kirby
twins."
Gosh, got to even wonder if he knew who he sold it to.
The Kirby twins? They're not twins. They're brothers.
One's fifteen. One's seventeen. They don't look alike.
You saw both of them yesterday. And yet here in the
statement, he says, "I sold it to the Kirby twins."
(R. 408-09.)

The prosecutor found an opportunity in the lack of

detail, and filled in the gaps with unfounded speculation that
Sanslow and/or Massey were in the business of selling guns. (See
R. 358; 408-09.) If Sanslow had testified, his testimony would
have provided new, additional information that would have
clarified the written statement and dispelled unfounded
speculation and misconceptions. Sanslow's more detailed affidavit
testimony did not simply bolster credibility, but it also
discredited the prosecutor's attack.

Sanslow's more detailed

independent statement was the only evidence that would have
corroborated and fully explained Massey's defense. The jury never
heard Sanslow's independent testimony.

"Evidence from a neutral

third party is not merely cumulative of a criminal defendant's
testimony.

It is of a different kind and nature than defendant's

statements, and it certainly could have a different quality in
the eyes of the jurors who assess the credibility of the
witnesses."

James, 819 P.2d at 794 (notes omitted).

Massey has

satisfied the second element set forth in James.
B. A DIFFERENT RESULT IS PROBABLE IF MASSEY IS GRANTED A
NEW TRIAL.
The third prong concerns a prejudice analysis.

The court

must consider whether evidence that is now available is such "as
to render a different result probable on retrial of the case."
9

James, 819 P.2d at 793.

The state contends the third prong has

not been met for several reasons: first, the prosecutor could
have engaged in tactics on retrial to discredit Sanslow's
detailed testimony of the transaction; second, Sanslow's
testimony would have been cumulative where "other evidence
bolster[ed]" the credibility of the two-sentence written
statement; and third, the evidence marshalled in favor of the
conviction, including "other evidence of defendant's guilt" and
"defendant's inconsistent statements," supports the conviction.
(S.B. 13-15.)

Massey responds to each of the state's assertions

in turn.
1. The State's Contention That the Prosecutor Could Have
Engaged in Tactics on Retrial to Discredit Sanslow's
Testimony Is Speculative and Inappropriate.
According to the state, Massey has failed to meet the third
factor in James for the following reason: if Sanslow's complete
testimony would have come into evidence on retrial, the state
still would have been able to challenge Sanslow's credibility.
(S.B. at 13.)

That assertion refers to remarks the prosecutor

would have made in closing argument on retrial, as opposed to the
remarks concerning credibility that he made during the trial in
this matter: During closing argument, the prosecutor exploited
the brevity of the written statement by speculating that Massey
and/or Sanslow were involved in selling guns.

He stated, "[the

statement d]oesn't even refer to [the gun] as a Derringer. You
got to wonder whether [Sanslow's statement is] even talking about
the same gun. I mean maybe they sold so many guns, they're
starting to get confused over how many guns they sold and on
10

which days."

(R. 408-09.)

The state acknowledges that while

Sanslow's "additional details" of the transaction resolve such
conjecture (thereby "cur[ing]M the exploitation "problems" with
the prosecutor's closing argument (S.B. at 13)), "[t]he
additional details would not prevent the State from challenging
Casey's credibility."

(S.B. at 13.)

The state's assertion is irrelevant.
credibility is for the jury.

The issue of

In addition, the prejudice analysis

does not require the parties to consider whether the prosecutor
could have come up with some argument in closing or with crossexamination during retrial to discredit Sanslow's new testimony,
but whether the new evidence supports Massey's defense and
provides additional, independent information for the jury's
consideration.
In addition, the state's assertion that Sanslow's complete
testimony would not have prevented "the State from challenging
[Sanslow's] credibility" is based on sheer speculation.

The

state assumes to know definitively what the prosecutor would have
said concerning the credibility of Sanslow's testimony in closing
argument on retrial, and whether such closing remarks would have
been admissible and received by the trial court.

Nothing in the

record supports how the prosecutor would have summarized
Sanslow's testimony in closing argument on retrial.

Thus, the

state should not be permitted to speculate on such matters.

This

Court should disregard the state's response as inappropriate,
speculative and irrelevant.
Most importantly, the state is forced to concede that the
11

new details would have prevented the prosecutor from speculating
as he did with regard to the written statement. Among other
things, the prosecutor would not have been able on retrial to
place a question in jurors' minds as to whether Sanslow's written
confession related to the same transaction at issue in Massey's
case (R. 408-09 ("Notice how [Sanslow] identifies the gun. . . he
calls it [] a little .22 handgun. . . You got to wonder whether
he's even talking about the same gun")); and the prosecutor would
not have been able on retrial to suggest to jurors that Sanslow
and/or Massey "sold so many guns, they're starting to get
confused over how many guns they sold and on which days"

(id.).

The state is forced to acknowledge the new evidence would clarify
those issues for the prosecutor and the jury.
2. The State Is Making Another Run at Its "Merely
Cumulative" Argument in Claiming That "Other Evidence
Bolster fed]" the Credibility of the Two-Sentence Statement.
Next, the state asserts that a new trial would not compel a
different result because of the "other evidence bolstering the
[written] statement's credibility."

(S.B. 13.)

By that asser-

tion, the state suggests Sanslow's more detailed testimony would
have added nothing to a new trial. That issue goes to the "merely
cumulative" prong of the analysis.

As set forth above and in the

opening brief on appeal, Sanslow's affidavit statement is not
"merely cumulative," but provides independent details concerning
the transaction with the Kirby brothers. Those details should

12

have gone to the jury for consideration.1
3. Rather Than Consider the "Prejudice" Prong, the State
Has Improperly Marshalled the Evidence in Favor of the
Verdict.
Finally, in lieu of the prejudice analysis, the state has
employed a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis and has
proceeded to "marshal" the evidence in favor of the jury's
verdict.

The state points to the "other evidence of defendant's

guilt," the testimony of the Kirby brothers and the investigating
officers, and "defendant's inconsistent statements" to assert the
evidence supports the conviction. (S.B. 13-15.)

The marshalled

evidence is irrelevant. It adds nothing to the fact that the jury
was never given the opportunity to assess Sanslow's independent
testimony going to the details of the transaction, and his clear,
detailed confession going to the offense.

Sanslow's detailed

statement goes to the heart of Massey's defense.
In James, 819 P.2d at 795, the trial court denied the motion
for a new trial because there was "sufficient" evidence to
convict.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, stating that although

the evidence may have been sufficient, the new testimony went to
1

Incidentally, the state has misrepresented the
"evidence^
bolstering the statement's credibility. (S.B. at 13.) The state claims
the "investigating officer stated that [Sanslow] consistently maintained
his guilt and defendant's innocence, " thereby bolstering the statement's
credibility. Yet the investigating officer clearly testified twice that
notwithstanding Sanslow's written confession, he charged Massey with the
crimes. He apparently believed the Kirbys' statements over the written
confession. The officer never testified in a manner that "bolstered" the
statements credibility. His testimony did just the opposite.
In addition, "defense counsel['s]" statements "reinforc[ing] the
confession's credibility" (S.B. at 13) do not rise to the level of
"evidence," specifically where the jury was instructed that it "should
not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial,
unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence
of a fact or facts." (R. 52.)
13

the heart of the defendant's case and corroborated defendant's
statements.

The new evidence placed the "sufficient" evidence in

question:
Our review of the evidence presented in the case shows that
evidence of an intentional or knowing killing, while
sufficient, is not overwhelming or compelling. Without the
evidence of a plan to kill the child which can be derived
from Peterson's testimony, the evidence of an intentional or
knowing killing is scant and susceptible to differing
interpretations. Peterson's testimony went to the heart of
the evidence against defendant. Evidence that defendant was
at the marina prior to his baby's disappearance and
therefore had formulated a plan to kill the child was
crucial to finding that defendant had the requisite intent
to be convicted of murder. Without Peterson's testimony,
which established this evidence, it is probable that a
reasonable jury would have had a reasonable doubt as to
whether defendant had the requisite intent to commit murder.
Id. at 795.
In this case, the state cites to the testimony of the Kirby
brothers where they identify "defendant as the one who sold Grant
the Derringer" and to "defendant's inconsistent statements."

The

testimony from the Kirby brothers puts Massey in the same
position as the defendant in James, where witness Peterson
testified that the defendant made a confession, while the
defendant denied the same.
Although Massey provided testimony that he was not involved
in the transaction (R. 335-54; 361-62), Sanslow is the only
witness who could discredit the Kirby brothers' testimony by
providing clear details of the transaction.

That is the more

compelling basis for granting a new trial and submitting the
credibility issues to the jury.
With respect to "defendant's inconsistent statements," the
state acknowledges that Massey consistently
14

referred to Sanslow

throughout his testimony. The state also described confusion with
regard to Massey's testimony regarding what "Casey [Sanslow] had
told" Massey about the transaction. (S.B. at 14-15.)

Clearly,

Sanslow could have provided complete, independent testimony
concerning his discussions with Massey.

Again, Sanslow's

testimony would not have been cumulative, but would have been
enlightening with regard to the transaction and would have been
the only testimony to corroborate Massey's defense. The state's
entire response provides compelling bases for reversing the
conviction and remanding the case for a new trial.

Sanslow can

provide detailed, independent testimony that would clear up the
misconceptions and speculation the state presents in its
response.

Massey has met all factors set forth in James.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in the original brief on
appeal, and as supported by the record, Massey respectfully
requests the entry of an order (1) reversing the trial court's
denial of the motion for new trial, and (2) remanding the case to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with such a
reversal.
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